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Summary 
The prospect of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union (EU) in 2019 casts a 
shadow on the already unstable peace in Northern Ireland, the British exclave in the 
northeast of the island of Ireland. This report outlines the approach, framework condi-
tions and course of the Northern Irish peace process – as well as the signs of its impend-
ing collapse. It also outlines the challenges that a “Brexit” poses for continued peaceful 
relations in Northern Ireland. 
Some twenty years ago, Northern Ireland was basking in the glory of a unique peace 
process that culminated in the Belfast Agreement of 1998. The accord regulated opposing 
traditions and mutually exclusive political goals in a society and political landscape that 
had suffered 30 years of violent conflict. It rendered violence unnecessary and permitted 
democratic governance. However, implementing the peace plan proved to be more ardu-
ous than anticipated. Nevertheless, time and again, the peace process and expectations 
that peace was possible created the dynamism needed to overcome obstacles placed by 
local adversaries. In addition to the financial aid, expertise and political pressure from 
outside, EU membership offered a favorable context. 
As the process of transforming the violent conflict into a consolidated peace dragged 
on, however, the glory faded. Over the years, the radical unionist and nationalist factions 
marginalized moderate forces. The two camps became more entrenched, and the old slo-
gans about winning the peace through democratization were forgotten. Instead, the for-
mer conflict parties got used to doing business with each other without resolving the root 
causes of the conflict. The fact that starting in 2007, state institutions managed to function 
for ten years under the unionist-nationalist executive imposed by the Belfast Agreement 
was construed as success. Then, in January 2017, following an election marathon between 
2015 and 2017 that polarized the two camps, the power-sharing arrangement collapsed. 
Since then, Northern Ireland has had no functioning legislative assembly or administra-
tion. Even worse, the country is again being governed by London, and Northern Ireland 
has no say in the Brexit negotiations. 
The impending Brexit has paralyzed the disintegrating peace process. It has also repri-
oritized the issue of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, 
which the Brexit will transform into an external border between the United Kingdom and 
the EU. Thereafter, cross-border movement of persons, goods and services will have to be 
controlled, effectively destroying a fundamental advantage of the peace process in which 
the border disappeared from everyday life. The basic principles of the peace agreement 
have been undermined. Unionists share the British government’s wish to turn its back on 
the EU – despite knowing that the majority of the population in Northern Ireland are not 
behind them – while nationalists consider that London’s focus on England robs them of 
the hope of overcoming the island’s division through its opening to the EU. 
The Brexit does not only reveal rifts in the British-European relationship; it also ex-
poses the latent discord in Northern Ireland. The peace process has gone to the dogs. 
Established procedures can no longer help maintain the peace. A fresh start is needed and 
 II 
future uncertainties must not lead to the dismantling of institutions and mechanics set 
out in the Belfast Agreement. Attention should be given to eventually redesigning the 
political map of the British Isles – although that has little chance of short-term success 
because of the current lack of ideas and political assertiveness in Northern Ireland. The 
rest of the world gives no sign of any inclination to invest more energy there. 
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1. Enchantment and disenchantment 
On 29 March 2017, the British government duly informed the EU of its wish to terminate 
its membership in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (the 
Prime Minister’s letter to the European Council President). It now has two years to agree 
on the terms and settle the related costs and legal issues. The anticipated Brexit puts 
Northern Ireland back on the European agenda. The EU has made the clarification of 
future relations between the two jurisdictions on the island of Ireland, EU citizens’ future 
status in the United Kingdom and a cost accounting for the Brexit the preconditions for 
negotiating its altered relationship with the United Kingdom (European Council, 2017, 
Section 11). Old disputes have resurfaced despite the stable relations that had developed 
in Northern Ireland over the last decade. In fact, the “normality” resulting from the peace 
process masked persistent societal and political fault lines. Once again the “Irish question” 
is a stumbling block for British politics; it is also a challenge to the success of the Europe-
an project. In 1890, the British Chief Secretary for Ireland Arthur Balfour, remarked, “It 
does not rest with one individual, with one government completely to solve so ancient a 
controversy, so old an historic difficulty as ... the Irish Question“ (quoted in Fanning 
2013: 361). British politicians argued about home rule for the island of Ireland 120 years 
ago. Between 1920 and 1922, it was partitioned. Then the South and Northwest became 
the Republic of Ireland while the Northeast remained part of the United Kingdom. Once 
again, the relationship between the larger and smaller parts of the terrain termed the 
“British” islands and the status of the British polity in the northeast of the island of Ire-
land is an issue. The current debate centered on the future border on the island involves 
internal and external problems of its societies and countries. 
Thirty years ago things looked very different. At that time, a distinctive event captured 
the world’s attention: Politicians, journalists, artists and researchers from around the 
world were watching the incredible developments in the backyard of Europe’s oldest de-
mocracy.1 Northern Ireland was the site of a real civil war followed by a one-of-a-kind 
peace process. In the middle of a highly militarized territory convulsed by murders and 
bomb attacks as well as the collapse of the state of law, ideas had been explored that, in 
1998, were finally put together in a peace agreement. International awards such as the 
Nobel Peace Prizes2 of 1976 and 1998 and two German tributes, the Hessian Peace Prizes3 
of 1995 and 1999, honored those efforts. The tangible results in Northern Ireland were 
regarded as a model for peace processes – from the cautious approach to talks, through 
the negotiations and signing of the peace agreement, and the individual steps of imple-
 
 
1 Northern Ireland accounts for 5.7 percent of British territory; its 1.8 million inhabitants represent 2.9 
percent of the British population. 
2 In 1976, to the two peace activists Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan, and in 1998, the political leaders 
David Trimble (unionist) and John Hume (nationalist). 
3 In 1995, John Hume, and in 1999, the American politician George J. Mitchell for his negotiating. 
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mentation. The way was marked by setbacks, standstills and disturbances as well as the 
joy of progressing toward a comprehensive and lasting peace (Darby/MacGinty 2003: 256; 
Moltmann 2011; Tonge 2014: 7, 11). 
Since then, however, the politicians, journalists and researchers have shifted their at-
tention to new places, conflict configurations and issues: Many war zones around the 
world need help. Current attempts to create and consolidate peace are proceeding on 
smaller scales that are also more context-specific (MacGinty: 2010); now there is less in-
clination to try to apply the models of one peace process to another. In Northern Ireland, 
the prominence once accorded its peace agreement and actors is at most revived on nota-
ble anniversaries or when former heroes are brought to their graves.  
Interest in Northern Ireland has been revived in connection with studying the trajecto-
ries of peace processes4 because its case allows conclusions to be drawn about why hopes 
are fading and daily difficulties increasing, as well as why approaches to peace processes 
lose their appeal and utility for policy-making. Here I first outline the Northern Irish con-
flict configurations and then describe the structure of the once eulogized peace process. 
Its practical application to Northern Ireland‘s reality did not follow the conceptual flights 
of fancy. Far from it: In the face of difficulties, the motto “We’ve got to keep the peace 
process going!” was often repeated. Or, in the words of Jonathan Powell, a longtime ad-
viser to British Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997–2007), one has to keep the bicycle mov-
ing because once it falls over it is hard to pick it up (Powell 2008: 322). The impending 
Brexit has brought the wobbling Northern Irish bicycle to a halt and it now threatens to 
fall over. The question mark in the title of this report hints that the Northern Irish peace 
process may well be over. This is indicated by a state of inner exhaustion on one hand and 
developments beyond the reach of the Northern Irish protagonists, especially the British 
decision to leave the European Union in 2019, on the other. The history of the Northern 
Irish conflict and the peace process color my view of a Brexit. 
2. A conflict and its settlement5 
2.1 The configuration of the conflict  
In the “Northern Ireland conflict,” two population groups identified by background and 
religious affiliation are pitted against each other. While living in the same state territory, 
they pursue politically contrary aims and fight over their shared statehood. The two 
groups are generally assigned to the “protestant” or “unionist” and “catholic” or “nation-
 
 
4 This report includes events up to 4 December 2017. 
5 The next two chapters summarize and update the analyses of Moltmann (2013) and Moltmann (2016) 
which includes additional references. 
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alist-republican” camps. The unionist side invokes its English and Scottish ancestors who 
settled the northeastern part of Ireland four hundred years ago, and insists that Northern 
Ireland must remain part of the United Kingdom. For that reason, their political parties 
operate under the banner of “unionism.” The nationalist-republican camp asserts its de-
scent from the original inhabitants of the island of Ireland and is committed to its politi-
cal unification. It rejects the British monarchy and sovereignty and supports Irish nation-
alism or republicanism and the corresponding “nationalist” or “republican” parties. Until 
the turn of this century, unionists comfortably constituted the majority of the population 
in Northern Ireland. However, the 2011 census revealed that their lead had shrunk to just 
54,000 in a total population of 1.8 million. On average, the nationalist population is 
younger than the unionist (McWilliams 2017), which means that in Northern Ireland a 
shrinking majority is faced with a growing minority. Denominational differences are used 
to cloak rivalries regarding collective identities, access to power and resources, and a po-
litical community’s efforts to protect its specific traditions and goals. The conflict in 
Northern Ireland displays many characteristics of a conflict over “identity.” It is the major 
factor in socialization (Brubaker 2004: 39). 
Until the 1970s, the politically dominant unionists refused to grant the nationalist-
minded population respect or the right to participate. Their daily experience of discrimi-
nation and repression mobilized a nationalist civil rights movement, whose repression led 
to violent protests against the state and its security forces, and escalated into a civil war 
that has left many signs of violence in its wake. Some 300,000 soldiers were stationed in 
Northern Ireland in the largest British military operation since World War II. Between 
1969 and 2001, more than 3,600 people lost their lives through politically motivated vio-
lence. Over 47,000 people – or one in 20 – were injured, and one in five experienced death 
and injury in their immediate vicinity. Some 16,200 bombings, 37,000 cases of firearm 
use, 22,000 armed assaults and 2,200 arson attacks were registered. Between 1980 and 
2005, paramilitary organizations drove around 4,600 people out of the country (Kandel 
2005: 9). More than 500,000 Northern Irish still suffer from long-term psychiatric effects, 
and every third person sees themselves as a victim (Belfast Telegraph, 30 Oct. 2015). The 
suicide rate in Northern Ireland is considerably higher than the average for Great Britain, 
an indication of the conflict’s long-term traumatic impact (The Irish Times, 4 Feb. 2016). 
The persistence of many signs of a divided society is striking.6 Its fault lines are not just 
shown by the colors of the curbstones and the different flags. In addition, high-tech mili-
tary-style fortifications (“peace walls”) divide areas with different political-denomi-
national population groups, especially in Belfast’s socially disadvantaged districts. As the 
Agreement has aged, these walls have increased in number – from 22 in 1994 to 116 in 
2017. Meanwhile, the school system perpetuates social segregation, with only seven per-
 
 
6 The Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report (published annually between 2012 and 2014, and every 
other year starting in 2016) provides overviews and lots of data on political, legal, social and economic re-
lations between 2012 and 2016. 
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cent of all children attending non-denominational schools. This situation goes back to the 
Roman Catholic Church’s insistence in the nineteenth century that it be granted the right 
to run its own schools. Residents continue to prefer their denominationally and politically 
homogeneous neighborhoods and resist efforts to persuade them to move to mixed public 
housing. Although the annual marching season commemorating the 1689 victory of 
protestant King William of Orange over catholic King James II is mostly celebrated in 
protestant-unionist-loyalist areas, it still stirs fear of unrest because parades are often 
routed through neighborhoods that have become predominantly catholic. In summer 
2017, the Parades Commission placed restrictions on 131 of more than 3,000 parades 
deemed contentious or offensive (The Irish Times, 29 Oct. 2017). Members of the “Or-
ange Order” resent government interference, which they view as restricting their freedom 
of expression and demonstrating a lack of respect for their cultural traditions. 
Despite these perennial tensions, violence has sunk to its lowest level in 40 years. Re-
portedly, violent loyalist and republican organizations remain active (The Irish Times, 5 
Dec. 2016), with around 140 groups judged to have the capacity to attack. However, their 
activities no longer destabilize the political system, especially because criminal economic 
activity and infighting have discredited them in the eyes of the population. Nevertheless, 
there are still lawless areas where paramilitary organizations – mostly loyalist – exercise 
social control and act as vigilantes. Between 2012 and 2016, in more than 2,000 known 
cases, people had to abandon their homes or apartments because local paramilitaries 
judged their behavior or ethnic-religious background unacceptable (The Irish Times, 5 
Nov. 2017). These days, sectarian hatred and racism are particularly aimed at people who 
have migrated to Northern Ireland and at Roma, who have always been persecuted and 
were never regarded as acceptable neighbors (McVeigh 2015:14). 
2.2 Contours of the peace process 
During the civil war, only a few individuals and groups called for an end to the violence 
and for peaceful coexistence. The conflict had so deeply invaded everyday life that appeals 
to give one’s life for the just cause and personal convictions outweighed any willingness to 
compromise and live in peace. Efforts to resolve the conflict non-violently only began to 
gain momentum in the early 1990s when all parties – apart from the hardliners and dissi-
dents on both sides – understood that the republican camp and the Provisional IRA could 
not bomb the British out of the country, nor could the state security forces, police and 
army eliminate the guerrillas. The government in Dublin was eager to promote the eco-
nomic upturn of the Republic of Ireland free of pressure from fighting in the North. Brit-
ish governments – first under John Major (conservative, 1990-1997) then Tony Blair (la-
bour, 1997-2007) – were also tired of the Northern Irish “Troubles.” As Northern Ireland 
Secretary Peter Brooke stated in 1990, the outpost in the northeast of the island of Ireland 
was not strategically or economically significant to the United Kingdom (Catterall/ 
McDougal 1996: 5). That’s why, in 2016, John Major and Tony Blair campaigned in 
Northern Ireland for the British to remain in the EU. They were concerned about the 
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peace that they had helped bring about – and which they saw threatened by a Brexit (Bel-
fast Telegraph, The Guardian, The Irish Times, 10 Jun. 2016). 
Below I outline the elements of the Northern Irish peace process and then discuss the 
factors and framework conditions for creating the peace. A cursory glance at the imple-
mentation of the Agreement shows that it required great effort – and was only fragmen-
tary (Hauswedell 2017). Now the Brexit crisis is revealing many problems because incom-
plete solutions had been accepted in the name of not jeopardizing the entire peace 
process. 
Elements of the Northern Irish peace process included: (1) the equal participation of 
all actors who renounced violence; (2) British and Irish government leaders’ readiness to 
accompany local developments, along with the good will of the EU and numerous US 
administrations; (3) ample economic and financial support to redress the impacts of vio-
lent conflict, as well as to mitigate the costs of partitioning the island and cushion the 
effects of Northern Ireland’s de-industrialization (that started in 1970); (4) sufficient time 
to address controversial issues, coupled with the plausible threat of sanctions; and (5) 
novel compromises to help all sides overcome the apparently insurmountable. 
The reason why Northern Ireland is currently caught between civil war and a consoli-
dated peace can be traced to various factors. One is that the decision about Northern Ire-
land’s state sovereignty has been postponed because the adversaries have accepted the 
status quo and agreed that a referendum will eventually be held in both the North and the 
South. Although no vote will be scheduled until a change of mood regarding Northern 
Ireland’s status in the United Kingdom is clearly identifiable, since the final decision is 
still pending, uncertainty continues to smolder. The state’s monopoly on using force and 
the return to the rule of law have been more or less accepted. The Northern Irish benefit 
from the local autonomy – “devolution” – that the British government has gradually 
granted to all regions but England. Foreign, security, monetary and fiscal policies remain 
the British government’s purview but citizens in the different regions regulate their inter-
nal affairs with “devolved” governments. Regular regional and local elections are consid-
ered fair. The Northern Irish participate in elections to the British House of Commons 
and the European Parliament. Nevertheless, the threat remains that London will resume 
direct rule over Northern Irish affairs if local politicians cannot reach an agreement. Until 
March 2017, the unionist and nationalist camps had come to terms with their obligatory 
system of power-sharing that is fundamentally different from the British majoritarian 
democracy in which the parliamentary majority governs and the minority acts as the op-
position. In Northern Ireland’s “consociational” democracy, minorities are amply repre-
sented in the executive branch of government. Consociational democracies are based on 
the mutual respect of competing collective identities, which are granted great autonomy 
to preserve their traditions and cultures. The various political parties are required to col-
laborate in the executive and legislative branches of government (where they are propor-
tionally represented), regulating matters of concern to the whole society and statehood. 
Well-balanced electoral systems ensure that the various camps are fairly represented 
(Gromes 2007: 107 f., Tonge 2014: 40–47). 
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In addition to these legal and domestic political factors, there is an international di-
mension to the peace in Northern Ireland: Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland are 
co-guarantors of the Belfast Agreement. They monitor the work of Northern Irish institu-
tions and mediate any disputes that local political actors can or will not resolve. While EU 
membership has not eliminated the two countries’ political and economic differences, it 
does ensure that the governments are on equal footing. Meanwhile, closer contacts have 
developed between the North and South of the island of Ireland, and the two govern-
ments’ semi-annual consultations have become institutionalized. Other linkages have 
developed in the healthcare, energy and tourism sectors, as well as waterways and infra-
structure, and the two legal spheres cooperate to fight criminality, subsidy fraud and the 
shadow economy. 
These developments occurred as the two national economies became dovetailed as a 
result of the application of EU regulations regarding the intensive exchange of persons, 
goods and services between two currency areas. Targeted EU funding exists to help sur-
mount the social and economic consequences of the violent conflict, as well as the island’s 
partition. American policies – supported by all US presidents since the 1980s – have pro-
vided flank guards for the peace process. In addition, the Irish diaspora, especially in Eng-
lish-speaking countries, runs numerous financial aid programs. Compared with other 
post-civil-war societies, Northern Ireland has been able to pursue its peace process in 
economic and financial comfort. 
2.3 Implementation phases 
The peace strategy followed a three-pronged approach: First, stopping the use of violence 
as a tool of political discourse; second, restoring the rule of law and the state’s monopoly 
on using force; third, democratizing the power relations so as to give legitimately elected 
actors responsibility for this British region. A consociational democratic system ensured 
the unionist and nationalist camps equal powers. 
The three components of the peace strategy are reflected in the “Belfast” or “Good Fri-
day” Agreement of 10 April 1998 (The Agreement; summary in Moltmann 2016: 113f.) 
negotiated by the Northern Irish parties under British-Irish aegis. In Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland, referendums in favor of the Agreement created enough socie-
tal legitimation for it to become the basis for peace. Northern Ireland opened itself to 
cooperating with the South. At the same time, all government units on the islands began 
to collaborate. Then in 2007, under the eloquent evangelical preacher Ian Paisley, the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) became part of the equation. Until then, it had fought 
against the Agreement. Most of the people in Northern Ireland who had voted against the 
Belfast Agreement turned out to be DUP voters. 
Implementing the peace strategy in the following years proved to be very tricky. Secu-
rity reform mostly involved changing policing and getting the conflicting parties to 
acknowledge that the police have the monopoly on using force. The police force was 
transformed much faster than the paramilitary organizations were disarmed. For those 
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groups to not be stigmatized as losers they were allowed to disarm themselves. That took 
a lot of time: Only in 2005 did a commission of international experts appointed by Lon-
don and Dublin certify the Provisional IRA’s complete decommissioning; loyalist groups 
followed suit in 2009. However, this procedure did not require the groups to disband, and 
with their organizational structures intact, some moved into other rough activities: extor-
tion, money-laundering, subsidy fraud, dealing drugs and counterfeit products, as well as 
smuggling tobacco products, fuel and all kinds of waste between the North and South of 
Ireland. 
Efforts to establish democratic home rule dragged on over nine years. Between 1998 
and 2007, the more radical parties imposed themselves over the more moderate forces, 
with the leaders of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the republican-nationalist 
Sinn Féin entering government after the Northern Ireland Assembly elections in 2007. 
The two sides had settled into a kind of pragmatic confrontation, clinging to their differ-
ences but managing everyday affairs as long as they didn’t threaten their competing group 
identities. No effort is made to address new social and economic challenges. The only 
success is the fact that the institutions did not collapse between 2007 and 2017. However, 
as the current crisis shows, even the glow of this relative success has dimmed. The two 
camps have not been able to form a working power-sharing executive since the Northern 
Irish regional elections in March 2017. 
3. A slowdown in the peace process 
The Northern Ireland peace process is experiencing a major crisis, which some observers 
are calling a standstill (Kane 2017). Clearly, it has slowed down – for various reasons. 
First, during the long transformation from violent to civil-constitutional forms for resolv-
ing conflicts, the Northern Irish have become used to inconsistencies and deficiencies. 
Second, the rapid succession of elections and referendums between 2015 and 2017 solidi-
fied the political landscape’s binary coding. Finally, in 2016, the British decision to leave 
the EU severely strained the peace process, crippling the outside forces and actors that 
had helped Northern Ireland stay the course. The Brexit also threatens important EU 
funding. I will first examine domestic problem areas, then in the next chapter, the effects 
of a Brexit. 
3.1 The price of a long drawn-out transformation phase 
Ten years have passed since Northern Ireland’s devolution began in 2007, as set out in the 
Belfast Agreement. The peace process has aged since the Agreement was signed in 1998. 
Its drama, urgency and élan have worn off. The competing unionist and nationalist-
republican camps accept the power relations as long as their interests aren’t threatened. 
Each camp’s attempt to change the balance in its favor arouses the other’s resistance. The 
dispute is no longer over constitutional issues, however. Now it is about the symbols, 
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status and historical interpretations associated with each side’s collective identity. This 
explains the vehemence with which unionists repel nationalists’ push for the Irish lan-
guage to have official status alongside English. 
Political parties that vehemently champion their own community’s concerns thrive on 
defending issues of identity and try to obtain the most they can for their own camp. In so 
doing, they distinguish themselves. Research on Northern Irish political parties terms 
them “ethnic tribune parties” (Mitchell et al. 2009: 397), which are represented on the 
unionist side by the DUP and on the nationalist, by Sinn Féin. These two parties from the 
extremist fringes of the unionist and nationalist camps rose to their current leadership 
positions because they initially criticized the system and accused the more moderate par-
ties negotiating the Belfast Agreement of betraying the cause by being too ready to com-
promise. Not surprisingly, the DUP and Sinn Féin have difficulty cooperating or develop-
ing new strategies. 
In 1998, the conflicting parties were paid twice to accept a power-sharing arrangement 
and political institutions linking Northern Ireland with the Republic and other parts of 
the British Isles. On one hand, Great Britain, Ireland and the EU granted them generous 
financial support, and on the other, they allowed a bloated government sector to be creat-
ed in Northern Ireland to give the two sides space to develop. Today, Northern Ireland is 
the United Kingdom’s biggest burden – with the biggest per-person deficit – because its 
tax income cannot cover government expenses. In 2016, Northern Irish public spending 
amounted to GBP 14,020 per head but only tax revenue of GBP 8,580 was raised per per-
son (Belfast Telegraph, 24 May 2017). The GBP 9 billion that the British Exchequer trans-
fers annually to Northern Ireland represents 21 percent of the payment to all four British 
regions, well above the average payments (Meagher 2016: 73). The same holds for EU 
Common Agricultural Policy funds and structural support: Northern Ireland tops all 
British regions (Paun/Cheung 2017: 4). EU subsidies account for 87 percent of Northern 
Irish farm income, compared with just 53 percent in the entire United Kingdom. More 
than 8 percent of the Northern Irish gross domestic product (GDP) comes from programs 
financed by the EU. In 2015, the public sector in Northern Ireland provided 28 percent of 
all jobs in 2015 – 10 percent higher than in England (based on Burke 2017: 6f.). The con-
servative government in London has been demanding spending cuts for healthcare, the 
social sector, education and infrastructure in Northern Ireland, but for fear of alienating 
supporters, local parties either don’t make any budget decisions or transfer them to policy 
fields that have no lobbies, such as the police or the judiciary. Nevertheless, in addition to 
reallocating powers and changing the boundaries of the county councils, London man-
aged to reduce the number of members in the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2017 from 
108 to 90 and shrink the executive from 12 departments to nine. 
Even during the decade of Northern Irish devolved government (2007-2017), the 
tough issues were not tackled. These include punishing breaches of the law by govern-
ment and paramilitary actors during the violent conflict and establishing how to rehabili-
tate and compensate victims and survivors. Also not addressed was how to use the rule of 
law to deal with the persistent signs of ethnic hatred expressed at the annual Orange Or-
Northern Ireland: The end of the story? 9
 
 
der parades, as well as the practice of mocking places and symbols associated with the 
adversary. 
One important side effect of the long period of transformation is the generational 
change now occurring among the political elites. People who took part in the violent con-
flict and negotiated the Belfast Agreement, or were at least involved in its implementa-
tion, have left the political stage. The most prominent of them was Martin McGuinness, 
formerly second in command of the IRA Derry Brigade, who died on 21 March 2017. As 
the Sinn Féin representative, he served as deputy first minister in the Northern Ireland 
executive since 2007. Gerry Adams, the last person who had been involved in negotiating 
the Belfast Agreement, announced in November 2017 that after 34 years, he would give 
up Sinn Féin leadership in 2018. Now the early leaders’ children and grandchildren, who 
grew up during the violent conflict, are taking political positions. However, the younger 
generations have inherited the history of Northern Ireland without either personally ex-
periencing the conversion to peace and understanding or accepting the intentions and 
methods of the peace process. They are wearing their predecessors’ shoes but not taking 
any new steps. 
3.2 An election marathon’s paralyzing effect  
Northern Irish politics has been in election mode since 2015, especially because of domes-
tic British politics.7 The practical work of public officials and institutions has virtually 
ground to a halt while at the same time the two camps have intensified their disputes. 
Matter-of-fact controversies become emotionally charged and culminate in the verbal 
abuse and victimization of political representatives. This has pretty much eliminated any 
prospect of the two sides cooperating in Northern Ireland’s obligatory consociational 
democracy. However, more and more citizens are going to the polls: In 2017, 65.6 percent 
of eligible voters took part in the House of Commons elections, up from 58.5 percent in 
2015. Voters understood that they were making existential decisions. 
The ruling parties in both camps have benefited from the mobilization of the elec-
torate, while the smaller parties have continued to lose support and are no longer repre-
sented in the British House of Commons. Following the Northern Ireland Assembly elec-
tions on 2 March 2017, the nationalist-republican Sinn Féin party is just one member shy 
of the opposing DUP. For the first time since Ireland was partitioned in 1921 and North-
ern Ireland was founded, unionists no longer have a majority in the Northern Irish legis-
lative: Their predominance is threatened. However, in June 2017, the DUP won enough 
seats in the House of Commons to be able to help the shrunken conservative party in 
 
 
7 2015: Elections for the British House of Commons – 2016: Elections for the regional assembly and the 
British-EU Referendum – 2017: new elections for the regional assembly and the British House of Com-
mons. 
10 Bernhard Moltmann
 
 
Westminster form a majority. After weeks of wrangling, the unionists finally agreed that 
their 10 MPs would help the British government pass the annual budget and survive no-
confidence resolutions. In return, British Prime Minister Theresa May assured the DUP 
that Northern Ireland would receive another GBP 1 billion over the next few years – in 
addition to the GBP 500 million already allocated (Agreement 2017). However, six 
months later, the cash has only begun to flow slowly. It is also not clear if the additional 
payments are contingent on Northern Ireland having a functioning executive that can 
decide on appropriations. Added to that, Scotland and Wales have begun to complain 
that the regions are being treated unequally and have declared their financial needs in 
London. 
In any case, the DUP has gained considerable influence in the British government 
without having entered into any formal coalition with the conservative party. It already 
has threatened to withdraw its support should the conservative government be too ready 
to compromise with the EU in the Brexit negotiations (The Guardian/Belfast Telegraph, 
30 Nov. 2017). The DUP has further decided that it wants a seat at the negotiating table in 
Brussels and is claiming its right to object to European matters, although this was not part 
of the agreement of 26 June 2017 (Belfast Telegraph, 6 Dec. 2017). Britain’s weak con-
servative government has become hostage to Northern Irish unionists. On the other hand, 
Sinn Féin is not scoring any political points despite having won seven seats in the British 
House of Commons because republican parliamentarians refuse to take an oath to the 
British crown and occupy seats in Westminster. Doing so would go against the party’s 
principle of not acknowledging British sovereignty over their part of the island. So the 
Labour party, which is the largest opposition party in the British lower house, cannot 
count on Sinn Féin’s support – particularly since some party members fear that an alli-
ance with Sinn Féin would earn them the reputation of being unpatriotic. 
Since spring 2017, the nationalists’ gain in power in Northern Ireland and the DUP’s 
bigger role in London have made it even more difficult for the two sides to form a power-
sharing executive in Belfast. The last executive collapsed when the nationalists quit, cata-
lyzed by unionist majority leader Arlene Foster’s refusal to investigate devious subsidies 
during her tenure as enterprise minister, and called for new elections. Northern Ireland 
critically lacks a democratically legitimate, functioning government when state structures 
have to be modernized despite funding restrictions and radical changes in the political 
landscape on the Irish and British islands are imminent. 
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4. Destabilized by the Brexit8 
Events that did not originate in Northern Ireland are causing convulsions in the political 
constellation and negatively impacting the peace process. On 23 June 2016, a referendum 
was held on the United Kingdom’s future membership in the EU. Ahead of it, the regional 
governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland had urged in vain that the final 
outcome be made dependent on a unanimous vote in all four regions so as to take their 
different interests into consideration (See Reilly 2003: 179 f. on the risks in holding refer-
endums). The government and parliament in London merely repeated, “Majority is ma-
jority.”  
As expected, the results of the referendum were disparate: 52 percent of voters in Eng-
land and Wales voted to leave, while majorities in Scotland (62%) and Northern Ireland 
(55.8%) wanted to remain. In all, 51.9 percent of Britons (17.4 mil.) voted to leave the EU 
and 48.1% (16.1 mil.) to remain. Regional imbalances influenced the outcome of the ref-
erendum with the 15.2 million leave votes in England carrying the day (Uberoi 2016: 5). 
In Northern Ireland, votes traced the boundaries dividing nationalists (85% for remain) 
and unionists (leave). A majority in Northern Ireland voted to remain in the EU with core 
unionist voters in the country’s agricultural center “switching” (denominational) sides to 
join them, while in the unionist heartland in the northeast, leave advocates had the upper 
hand. In the border region, the vote was heavily in favor of remaining in the EU (North-
ern Ireland Assembly 2016: 10, Phinnemore/Hayward 2017: 27). The DUP was the only 
Northern Irish party that heavily campaigned for the United Kingdom to leave the EU. 
The EU referendum’s procedure and results did nothing to promote peace in North-
ern Ireland. In fact, two basic issues are back on the agenda: Northern Ireland’s position 
as a British territory on the island of Ireland and the basic contours of the political coex-
istence that had taken shape since the Belfast Agreement was signed in 1998. In the 20 
years in which relations flourished between the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland, between Northern Ireland and its southern neighbor and within Northern Ire-
land, these problem areas had not demanded anyone’s attention. 
4.1 Borders and status 
A British exit will create the United Kingdom’s only land border with the EU: a line of 500 
km cutting straight across the island of Ireland that is not concomitant with any natural 
formations or reflecting any historical events. First drawn in 1921, the border was intend-
ed to divide the island politically, keeping the counties with the majority of citizens loyal 
to Great Britain under British domination and ensuring that unionists were the majority 
 
 
8 For details see Bundeszentrale 2017 and Oppermann 2016. 
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in a new and viable Northern Ireland (de Barra 2017). Although travel between Great 
Britain and Ireland has been unrestricted since 1923, guard towers and street closings 
closely controlled the border during the violent conflict. All that, along with toll barriers, 
disappeared 20 years ago particularly because Ireland and Great Britain were EU mem-
bers when the European Single Market was established in 1993. Since then, more than 110 
million border crossings of persons have been registered annually, 14,800 of whom regu-
larly go from one territory to the other to work or study. In 2015, 1 million trucks, 1.3 
million vans and 12.5 million cars crossed the border. Healthcare facilities and schools in 
the North and South are shared (The Irish Times, 16 and 18 May 2017). 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland also have close economic ties. The South 
is Northern Ireland’s most important foreign trade partner, especially for food processing. 
Each week more than 10,000 pigs are brought from the South to the North, while one-
fourth of Northern Ireland’s milk is processed in the Republic. Irish ports are important 
transshipment points for Northern Irish goods heading to the rest of Great Britain. Since 
2007, a single electricity market has guaranteed the energy supply for both jurisdictions 
(HM Government 2017). 
North-South cooperation regulated by European legislation involves more than 140 
areas – from hygiene and environmental standards to water management (The Guardian, 
27 Nov. 2017). British government insistence that leaving the EU also means leaving the 
single market and the customs union jeopardizes economic and social integration on the 
island of Ireland by creating a “hard” border with all its implications for monitoring the 
movement of people and goods (Revenue 2016). Discussion about the border reintroduc-
es unresolved territorial disputes that were not considered in 1921, when the island was 
partitioned, or in 1925, when the border was revisited with regard to the management of 
Lough Foyle in the northwest (Burke 2017: 2). 
Directly after the Brexit vote, the newly elected British government especially protest-
ed EU citizens’ unimpeded access but also claimed that it did not want to return to the 
earlier monitoring measures along the British-Irish border. London would prefer that 
Dublin monitor access to the island in its sea- and airports and be rewarded with an open 
border to Northern Ireland for its efforts. Whether such a procedure is compatible with 
EU regulations on free travel or the Irish concept of sovereignty is another kettle of fish. 
Northern Irish nationalists, Dublin and Brussels prefer a natural border – the Irish Sea – 
between Ireland and Great Britain, with persons and goods controlled upon entering Brit-
ish territory. This variation would allow Northern Ireland, especially its agriculture and 
food and drink sectors, to continue to follow EU regulations and access the EU market 
(Pollack 2017). However, Northern Ireland’s important trade in goods and services des-
tined for Great Britain would have to be controlled. Unionists consider this proposal an 
anathema, fearing that Northern Ireland would be cut off from the United Kingdom and 
the union they so highly praise would be at risk. They do not acknowledge that aside from 
the consociational democracy imposed by the Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland is 
already living its own life in many regards (abortion, same-sex partnerships, sports). In-
stead of seeking special status for Northern Ireland, unionists are pushing for the Repub-
lic of Ireland leave the EU along with Great Britain. That would make any discussion 
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about borders unnecessary (Paisley Jr. 2017). However, this option clashes with the dis-
tinctly pro-EU position of a large majority of citizens of the Irish Republic, only 16 per-
cent of whom would agree to leave the EU with a Brexit (The Irish Times, 9 May 2017). 
One other old quandary has been revived that makes it hard to resolve the Northern 
Irish conflict, namely majority-minority relations within a state. Remain supporters were 
in the majority in both Northern Ireland and Scotland, but the larger number of voters in 
England caused voters in other regions to have no impact on the results. In Northern 
Ireland, Brexit supporters are in the minority, but they know that they are in harmony 
with the majority of English – leave – voters. In contrast, the Northern Irish remain ma-
jority is only in agreement with the Scots, who continue to call for another vote on leaving 
the United Kingdom, following an unsuccessful attempt in 2015.  
Even if London’s contradictions regarding the referendum results expose rifts in the 
British Union, most Northern Irish still cherish their bond with the “mainland.” Accord-
ing to current estimates, 55 percent of the population continues to want union with Great 
Britain, while 33 percent prefer unification with the South. Nevertheless, this attitude is 
volatile. The latest surveys show that the Northern Irish could change their minds de-
pending on how the negotiations go. If these spell worsened economic prospects for 
Northern Ireland, the wish for rapprochement with the South would rise, with 46 percent 
of those questioned advocating unification with the Republic of Ireland (Bell 2017). In 
case of a Brexit, 67 percent of respondents would approve of Northern Ireland having a 
special status, as opposed to the disapproval of only 27 percent (Coakley/Garry 2017). 
Appeals from Northern Irish nationalists for referendums on Irish unification to be 
held in both Northern Ireland and the Republic – thereby initiating the separation from 
Great Britain – get a lukewarm response in Dublin. Remain Unionists are also not keen 
on the idea. German efforts to overcome the effects of forty years’ division testify to the 
wisdom of taking a cautious approach to such an option. While the EU has recognised 
Northern Ireland’s right to rejoin the union in the context of a united Ireland, the Good 
Friday agreement stipulates that constitutional change can come about only via a border 
poll. (The Guardian, 30 April 2017). 
In Northern Ireland, there are a variety of views about who best represents the coun-
try’s interests. Unionists who voted to leave feel that they are well represented by the Brit-
ish government, which has indicated its line of approach for dealing with regional con-
cerns: The United Kingdom joined the EU as a whole and is now leaving together. For 
nationalists, their country’s subordinate position within the United Kingdom is one more 
sign of the dominating English nationalism that was so obvious throughout the Brexit 
campaign. That is why they want the Irish government to become more engaged, and are 
demanding coordinated Northern Irish-Irish action directed at Brussels. They prefer spe-
cial status for Northern Ireland within the EU. This option, however, is out of the ques-
tion for unionists because it threatens their biggest concern: preserving the union with 
Great Britain. Special status in the EU could move Northern Ireland closer to the Repub-
lic of Ireland. For that reason, unionists balk at any all-Ireland solution. In early Novem-
ber 2016, then-Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny’s invitation to an all-island forum about 
the consequences of a Brexit was rudely rebuffed by the Northern Irish First Minister 
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Arlene Foster. She insisted that existing institutions, particularly the semi-annual North/ 
South Ministerial Council, not a group of politicians, business people and members of 
civil society, are the appropriate venues for the governments to coordinate: Giving a say 
to other parties, trade associations or civil society groups is a waste of time (Belfast Tele-
graph, The Guardian, The Irish Times, 1–4 November 2016). 
4.2 Doubts about the future of the Agreement 
The outcome of the British-EU referendum undermined the foundations of power-
sharing in Northern Ireland because the Belfast Agreement specifically described the Irish 
Republic and the United Kingdom “as friendly neighbours and as partners in the Europe-
an Union.” A Brexit would destroy this fundament. The intergovernmental Agreement 
has also served as a vehicle and platform for putting the two countries on equal footing 
and normalizing their relations; it is an international treaty that was duly deposited at the 
United Nations by the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. 
The EU memberships of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom provided 
the guidelines for the executive in Belfast and the North/South institutions. The Agree-
ment stipulates that EU cooperation is to be coordinated with regard to common con-
cerns. Particularly for Northern Irish nationalist parties, EU membership has served as 
their link to the South and to Europe, and qualified their minority status at home. They 
considered it all the more important for the United Kingdom to enshrine the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in Northern Irish law, and viewed that as pro-
gress, although the British government and unionists had put off passing a Human Rights 
Act for Northern Ireland. It is unclear whether a Brexit would also see the British with-
draw from the ECHR and adopt its own legislation, which would amount to withdrawing 
from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, as Euro 
skeptics have long demanded. 
The Brexit also jeopardizes another innovation of the Belfast Agreement: citizenship. 
The Agreement had “deterritorialized” nationality, so to speak, by offering Northern Irish 
the possibility of carrying either British or Irish passports – or both. After the British ref-
erendum, Irish Republic authorities recorded a sizable increase in the number of applica-
tions for (EU) passports. A Brexit means that EU citizens living in Northern Ireland will 
be residing in a political entity that has turned its back on the EU. Their legal status will 
be inferior to that of citizens of Northern Ireland. EU citizens will thus have a harder time 
accessing healthcare and social services, and more difficulty reuniting their families – to 
say nothing of new procedures and added expense for obtaining residence permits. 
In 2016, two legal challenges from Northern Ireland were lodged against the British 
government in light of the United Kingdom foreseeably leaving the EU. They questioned 
whether a Brexit is compatible with British commitments in the Belfast Agreement. One 
group of nationalist and unaffiliated politicians wanted clarification about whether Lon-
don is authorized to unilaterally change Northern Ireland’s international status – over the 
heads of the Northern Irish – and replace EU regulations with UK laws. A second group 
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from human rights organizations and victims and survivors of the violent conflict feared 
losing the protection accorded by the ECHR, along with the recognition and compensa-
tion they’ve been granted by EU entities. The EU provides 85 percent of such funds. Crit-
ics also accused the British government of not considering the far-reaching economic, 
societal and environmental implications of EU membership. Both lawsuits ended up at 
the UK Supreme Court, which also heard Scottish and Welsh government challenges 
regarding the Brexit. The latter argued that London’s failure to seek their parliamentary 
approval before pursuing the Brexit infringes on their devolved governments’ rights and 
powers. However, the British government claims exclusive control over foreign affairs 
and security policy, and on 24 January 2017 the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs  
(The Supreme Court 2017): The Brexit does not undercut the Belfast Agreement. Nor did 
the Supreme Court grant any of the regions a say in the Brexit negotiations. It did, how-
ever, require the British government to seek authorization through an Act of Parliament. 
Although the UK’s highest court has confirmed that the Belfast Agreement remains 
binding and all sides are emphasizing how much they want to preserve it, these legal dis-
putes indicate fractures which may well have more to do with the spirit of the accord than 
with its wording. The Agreement was a political compromise containing intergovernmen-
tal and domestic components that were wholly dependent on the adversaries’ readiness to 
accept and implement it. The power-sharing mechanisms described in the Agreement 
assumed that sovereignty can be “shared” and is “divisible” – and is enhanced through 
transnational cooperation. Today these concepts clash with Brexiteers, including North-
ern Irish unionists who only align themselves with the United Kingdom. Such positions 
are incompatible with the principles of European integration, Dublin’s involvement in 
Northern Irish affairs, and ways of seeking compromise and consensus at home. North-
ern Irish unionists have abandoned the maxims that once guided the peace process. In 
reaction, nationalists have reverted to their original confrontational stance and are again 
encouraging a fight over collective identities (O’Dochartaigh/Hayward 2017). 
5. Conclusion: Sowing strife 
5.1 Irritations 
The Brexit negotiations create many explosive practical problems for Northern Irish insti-
tutions and their representatives. The largest unionist and nationalist parties – that are 
required to work together in the executive – have drawn diverging conclusions from the 
results of the referendum. Although the DUP and its leader Arlene Foster believe that 
their rejection of the EU has been confirmed, they know that the majority of the Northern 
Irish think otherwise. For that reason, they are urging everyone to keep calm and place 
their trust in the British government. In contrast, the republican-nationalist Sinn Féin 
with its Northern Ireland Assembly leader Michelle O’Neill and party chief Gerry Adams, 
who remains in the wings until 2018, consider that the pro-British side has fooled them 
once again. All the achievements of the Belfast Agreement are up for renegotiation, in-
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cluding Northern Ireland’s special significance due to its unique peace process that oblig-
es adversaries to respect each other’s traditions. English voters have undercut Northern 
Irish peoples’ right to self-determination. The British majority’s leave vote discredits the 
Northern Irish majority’s remain. 
The tangible problems that a Brexit will present Northern Ireland are well known. 
Most are related to EU program benefits – from extensive financial support for the agri-
cultural sector to funds for victims and survivors of the violent conflict. Since 1995, the 
EU has focused on supporting the peace process, including cross-border cooperation 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Brexit-induced problems include 
the future applicability of EU standards to environmental protection, public procurement 
and consumer rights, as well as how regional interests will be represented within the EU. 
Security issues are again of concern, with senior officers of the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland warning that an end to the EU-wide and highly effective Northern Irish-Irish 
collaboration would hinder its cross-border fight against organized crime. Experts fear 
that a Brexit could cause a rise in anti-British attitudes, presenting groups of violent re-
publican dissidents with a pretext to appeal for Irish solidarity and recruit new support-
ers. Looming over all these issues, however, is the central question of the future border 
between the North and South of the island of Ireland. 
The Northern Irish executive and administration in Belfast are presented with consid-
erable challenges for finding ways to maintain the current material standards. The newly 
exposed internal divergences and all the attendant uncertainties are testing the two major-
ity parties’ ability to collaborate. Added to that are doubts about whether the regional 
administration is even in a position to comprehend the extent of the practical problems 
posed by leaving the EU, and to devise solutions. The austerity measures imposed by 
London in past years have thinned out the administrative apparatus, which is already at 
the limits of its ability to perform. 
Reliable help is not likely to be provided by London or Dublin. In Whitehall, hard-
pitched battles are being fought about whether to drive a hard or soft Brexit. The DUP is 
seeking to prevent any broad compromises that could endanger the union of the two Brit-
ish regions. On 4 December 2017, the DUP leader blocked an agreement between the 
British government and the EU, after the two sides had agreed in a roundabout manner 
that Northern Ireland would continue to benefit from the current legal and trade regula-
tions in case of a Brexit. That would lessen the discord over the future border on the is-
land of Ireland. For its part, the Irish government has given up its traditional links to the 
United Kingdom in the belief that its interests are better protected by the 27 EU member 
states. It was easier for Dublin to change its position after long-serving Irish PM Enda 
Kenny was replaced by his much younger successor Leo Varadkar in summer 2017. Ire-
land’s new PM and new Foreign Minister Simon Coveney vehemently protest when their 
counterparts in London are ambiguous about the border. Heightened antagonism is 
heard in Brussels, too, as well as in the long-winded negotiations in Belfast to re-establish 
the mandatory unionist-nationalist executive. At the same time, Dublin is becoming con-
cerned about how much longer and for what price the EU-27 will support its position. 
Irish politicians are going to have to get used to defending Ireland’s interests within the 
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EU without British support. Just as the Brexit decision and the DUP’s influence are pres-
suring Great Britain so that it can no longer function as a neutral mediator in the North-
ern Irish peace process, the approaching Brexit is also pushing the Southern Irish to dis-
pense with impartiality. 
5.2 Making something new with the broken bits 
The success of the peace process in Northern Ireland depended on all supports becoming 
equally operational: the international dimension, the watchdog roles of London and Dub-
lin, and the mechanisms for the Northern Irish to create a compatible cooperation. Now 
all of this is up in the air. The Brexiteers did not sufficiently consider the side effects of 
their vote. They should have more closely considered the situation of all those affected. 
There has not been enough accountability.  
It’s impossible to overlook all the broken bits in Belfast. The Northern Irish peace pro-
cess has come to a standstill. It has lost its élan, and the domestic and foreign actors have 
taken their leave. The institutional network of the past 20 years has proved incapable of 
withstanding structural deficits and personal intrigues. Worst of all is the fact that the 
original interest in appeasing societal conflicts through democratization processes and in 
exercising sovereignty with full social legitimacy was forgotten during the long implemen-
tation phase. Incredibly, the various camps are once again demarcating their turf, taking 
the democracy deficit in stride, refusing all compromise and calculating zero-sum games 
in their battles for power and influence. Isolation and dissociation are poisoning the two 
dominant camps. Political parties and representatives have retreated to the security of 
their traditional clienteles and rebuff appeals to open up and compete with visions for the 
whole society. Gaining legitimacy through elections is no longer possible. Election results 
do not significantly change political balances of power; instead, they increase polarization. 
Nevertheless, this gloomy summing up does not mean that with the collapse of the 
peace process, Northern Ireland will return to its earlier violent configurations. Despite all 
the economic and political uncertainties and societal clashes, there is no talk of that. No 
political groups consider that renewed violence is in their interest, a fact that sets North-
ern Ireland apart from other post-conflict societies. According to statistical analyses, in 90 
percent of all post-civil-war constellations, there is a high likelihood of violence flaring up 
after a peace agreement has been negotiated and during its implementation (World Bank 
2011: 57–58). In Northern Ireland, though, the current limbo between violent conflict and 
efforts to avoid it is expected to continue. This uncertain situation must be managed – 
from clarifying who is going to pay for everything for how long and dealing with the lack 
of socially legitimized and politically controlled governance – to sorting out Northern 
Ireland’s relationship to the rest of the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and the 
Atlantic-European context. 
Whether the Brexit turns out to be “hard” or “soft,” the peace in Northern Ireland 
must be consolidated. At the very least, the goals and mechanisms of the Belfast Agree-
ment must be respected in the short-term. All state actors must acknowledge Northern 
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Ireland’s unique situation and Dublin’s right to have a say on issues that affect the whole 
island. Rights granted to the Northern Irish through the EU memberships of Great Brit-
ain and the Republic of Ireland must be guaranteed. This concerns the representation of 
Northern Irish citizens in the EU institutional framework, as in the case of EU parliamen-
tary elections. Finally, no matter how the issues of the border and cross-border monitor-
ing of persons, goods and services are settled, the dense web of North/South relationships 
on the island of Ireland must be preserved (Phinnemore/Hayward 2017: 36–40). The 
people of Northern Ireland cannot be asked to bear the brunt of the negative consequenc-
es of the English Brexit. As the conclusion of the Belfast Agreement almost 20 years ago 
and its subsequent implementation have shown, concerted British-Irish action can sub-
due the differences between the Northern Irish unionist and nationalist camps. Preserving 
the Belfast Agreement does not, however, preclude the review of certain practices, such as 
the relationship of the executive and the legislative, or a mandatory consociational de-
mocracy. 
For Northern Ireland, a more positive outcome to the peace process crisis caused by a 
Brexit would be an innovative approach like the peace strategy of 20 years ago, despite its 
constraints. In this case, it would make sense to use a practice from mediation: Broaden 
the horizon to solve small, limited problems. With regard to Northern Ireland and its 
internal conflicts and external challenges, this means seriously pursuing the idea of creat-
ing a single political unit on the island of Ireland – the way it already is economically. The 
United Kingdom would have to renounce its claims to sovereignty in the region – as men-
tioned in the Belfast Agreement. Northern Irish unionists in a new all-Irish state could be 
reassured through the creation of federal structures, which implies the Republic of Ireland 
reforming its current centralized system of government. The EU could surely suggest 
appropriate policy approaches for this. Such pragmatism shows that putting aside histori-
cal infatuation and ideological blinders makes it possible to find partial solutions for 
complex problems that demonstrate the will to make progress. The EU is a byword for 
institutional innovations that involve state and civil society actors and interests in deci-
sion-making. In the end, the EU indicates that despite various crises, visions of sovereign-
ty can open up realities not limited to the power of individual states (Laffan 2017: 46, 56). 
Such ambitious conceptualization for redesigning and managing state structures re-
quires strong political leadership with civic backing in London, Dublin and Belfast, as well 
as a supportive international environment. Even if nothing suggests that such ideas could 
be realized in the near future, new options should be seriously examined in a timely fash-
ion, and how to mobilize support and animate new ways of thinking and speaking should 
be studied. German philosopher and columnist Carolin Emcke wrote that this implies 
“reviving the political virtue of fantasy even if it leaves you open to attack” (Emcke 2017). 
In the 1980s and ‘90s, the beginning of the Northern Irish peace process was a similar 
gamble. Individuals and small groups slowly began to think the unthinkable, to seek “un-
acceptable contacts” and to marshal previously uninvolved forces. In the current predic-
ament, such an approach could lead to a new peace process. 
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